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RECENT DECISIONS

WILLS- PARTIAL INTESTACY-EFFECT OF ATTEMPT TO DISINHERIT
AN HEIR OR TO LIMIT Hrs SHARE -·- JVh~re testator beq~eathed° to. one 9f

his brothers "the sum of five dollars, this amount to be in full for any and all bequests I would leave him as a brother or heir," and certain property passed by
intestate succe~ion because of a void residuary clause, held, the share of the
brother, an heir, was restricted to nve dollars. LaMere v. hukson, 288 Mich.

99, 284 N. W. 659 (1939).
In an early English case 1 an attempt was made to preclude the widow from
sharing in certain intestate property because she had been bequeathed property
"in full satisfaction and recompense of all dower and thirds," but the Lord
Chancellor queried, "Being a legal intestacy, I am to control the Statute of

1

Pickering v. Stamford, 3 Ves, Jr. 492 at 493, 494, 30 Eng. Rep.

IIZI

(1797).
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Distributions? How can the court possibly do that?" And so, as in even earlier

cas;es,2 the court ruled that "neither an heir at law, nor ••• next of kin, can
be barred by any thing but a disposition of the heritable subject ••• to some
person capable of taking." Legalistic reasoning might seem to support that view;
succeeding cases 8 _lend practically unanimous approbation.' Starting with the
proposition that effective parts of a will are only those which attempt to make
disposition by describing legacy and beneficiary in positive terms, the courts
must inevitably reach that conclusion. Its positive provisions having been honored,
the will can then be put to one side and any remaining property distributed
according to the rules of intestate succession. This procedure, though, smacks of
of a mechanical precision which alone would cast suspicion on its validity. And
indeed, however convenient in application, the rule is perhaps grounded on
questionable analysis. Fundamentally, a will is "the legal declaration of a man's
intentions which he wills to be performed after his death." 5 If, then, clarity in
expression of intention be the criterion, negatively-phrased clauses should not be
disregarded 6 ·so long as their meanings are unambiguous. Viewed realistically,
each case would be decided, not by an arbitrary rule, but on the basis of the
testator's intention as shown by the particular set of circumstances involved. The
type of language used in the will and the reason for intestacy as to some of the
property would then receive more proper consideration.7 Most of the cases
would likely have come to the same result even from this approach, because the
evidence is usually not too convincing that the heir was intended to be cut off
from intestate property.8 But some decisions, perhaps influenced by the broad
2 Creswell v. Cheslyn, 2 Eden u4, 28 Eng. Rep. 843 (1762); Denn ex dem.
Gaskin v. Gaskin, 2 Cowp. 657 at 661, 98 Eng. Rep. u92 (1777).
8 Cases involving the widow's share must be put in a separate category beyond
the scope of this discussion. Courts have often barred the widow from sharing in
intestate property on the ground of the doctrine of election or modem statutes reversing the common law presumption against exclusion. For thorough discussion, see
Phelps, ''The Widow's Right of Election in the Estate of her Husband," 37 MicH.
L. REV. 236 at 255-272 (1938).
• ATKINSON, Wu.LS 97 (1937); l PAGE, WILLS, 2d ed., 1391 (1926); 18 C. J.
843 (1919); 40 CYc. 1498 (1912).
5 1 PAGE, WILLS, 2d ed., 3 ( 1926).
6 " • • • the intention which controls is that which is positive and direct, rather
than negative and consequential." Bill v. Payne, 62 Conn. 140 at 141, 25 A. 354
(1892).
1 It could be argued, for example, that where there is a lapsed or void devise,
exclusion of the: particular heir would be harder to justify than where testator never
did try to make testamentary disposition· of the, intestate property. This is not nee~
sarily true when, as in the principal case, the void gift was apparently for the benefit
of the other heirs.
8 Too often the intention to limit the heir can only be inferred, as where testator
has merely provided for a specific gift. Creswell v. Cheslyn, 2 Eden 124, 28 Eng. Rep.
843 (1762); ·Todd v. Gentry, 109 Ky. 704, 60 S. W. 639 (1901) (heir given a
two-dollar goldpiece to be marked: "It is my interest in [testator's] estate"); In re
Kimmel's Estate, 226 Pa. 47, 75 A. 23 (1909). Sometimes it is reasonable to say that
the restriction applies only to taking under the will. Southgate v. Karp, l 54 Mich.
697, 118 N. W. 600 (1908) {"all that I intended to give her by this instrument'');
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language of earlier cases,9 do defy the testator's unmistakable intention.10 Now,
however, there are at least three cases on record,11 including the principal case,
which supply amazingly simple solutions to the Lord Chancellor's dilemma. By
merely removing the particular heir in question from the group of heirs and
ordering distribution to those remaining,12 these courts seem effectively to demonstrate that the obstacles which usually prevent this result when the facts would
support it are illusory, mere verbalisms. Yet, however desirable it may be thus
to permit a testator to withdraw persons from the class of his heirs, the prevailing view has not been materially weakened. One of the minority cases has
been expressly overruled,18 while in the principal case the ruling was given only
slight consideration u and seems to be in unacknowledged conflict with established Michigan doctrine.111

lames D. Ritchie
Jones v. Warren, 124 Me. 282, 128 A. I (1925) (all but wife excluded "from taking
under this my last will"). But that argument is not always convincing. Wells v. Anderson, 69 N. H. 561, 44 A. 103 (1899) ("$1 and no more").
9 "Notwithstanding all words of anger and dislike applied to the heir he will take
what is not disposed of." Dictum of the Lord Chancellor in Pickering v. Stamford,
3 Ves. Jr. 492 at 493, 30 Eng. Rep. 1121 (1797).
10 Nagle v. Conard, 79 N. J. Eq. 124, 81 A. 841 (1911) ("said grandaughter
shall not receive more than $2000 of my estate under any circumstances"); Wells v.
Anderson, 69 N. H. 561, 44 A. 103 (1899) ("$1 and no more").
11 Principal case; Tabor v. McIntire, 79 Ky. 505 (1881) ("For sundry reasons
and bad treatment, it is my will that Boone Tabor shan't have any of my property'').
Although distinguishable as to certainty of testator's intention, this case was expressly
overruled by Todd v. Gentry, 109 Ky. 704, 60 S. W. 639 (1901'), note 8, supra.
In the third case, Succession of Allen, 48 La. Ann. 1036, 20 So. 193 (1896), wherein
certain heirs were given money and were to "have no interest in any other claim,"
the court excluded them from sharing in the intestate property because "testator must
have referred to [ the residuum of the estate] for there is no other fund upon which
[they] could assert any right." See dicta in Hoyle v. Stowe, 2 Dev. (13 N. C.)
3 I 8 ( I 8 30), to the effect that an heir can be excluded from intestate property unless
there be but one heir. And in Strauss v. Strauss, 363 Ill. 442, 2 N. E. (2d) 699
(1936), an heir is excluded from the class of heirs, which takes, however, under the
residuary clause.
12 In Tabor v. Mclnti::-e, 79 Ky. 505 at 506-507 (1881) the court said: "While
the testatrix had no right to alter the laws of descent, yet she ••• might designate and
exclude from participation in her estate persons who would otherwise inherit."
13 Note 11, supra.
u The report indicates that the particular heir in question made no appearance
in the proceedings; the question was not argued in the printed briefs of counsel; and
the court did not discuss or attempt to justify the ruling.
111 Cf. Southgate v. Karp, 154 Mich. 697, 118 N. W. 600 (1908). And note
the implication in In re Ives' Estate, 182 Mich. 699, 148 N. W. 727 (1914).

